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Abstract In addition to customized products and services,
personal data also enables personalized pricing. However,
consumers are often unwilling to accept being price dis-
criminated for fear that they would end up paying more for
the same product or service. This article demonstrates that
by rewarding consumers for disclosing personal informa-
tion it is possible to achieve a situation where first-degree
price discrimination is mutually advantageous and both buy-
ers and sellers gain by adopting such a pricing model. The
conditions required for this to happen are investigated and
the impact on social welfare is discussed. Finally, the arti-
cle considers the robustness of this model when consumers
adopt an opportunistic behavior which consists in manipu-
lating personal data in order to masquerade as a consumer
with a lower willingness to pay.
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Introduction
Personal data and their aggregation as ‘big data’ have
increasingly become a central focus of the research devoted
to electronic commerce. In particular, the personalization
of products and services is generally considered as one of
the key outcomes of the usage of big data. Beyond the cre-
ation of tailored products and services, another important
aspect of big data is that it also enables price personal-
ization. As mentioned in Spann et al. (2010), electronic
media have radically changed price-making decisions. The
massive amount of personal data that can be collected via
electronic networks provides means to accurately assess the
consumers’ willingness to pay, hereby enabling first-degree
price discrimination.1
Although other forms of price discrimination (e.g. ver-
sioning, freemium) have been commonly used since the
early days of the internet, examples of first-degree price
discrimination online are still exceedingly rare. The main
reason for that is not, however, a technical one. Indeed, in
2000, Amazon delivered a proof of the feasibility of this
form of price discrimination when it started to charge its
consumers different prices for the same product, based on
an estimation of each consumer’s willingness to pay for the
product.2 At the time, the willingness to pay of consumers
was calculated based on the (crude) information contained
in cookies. However, this strategy rapidly backfired when
some consumers realized they were paying more than others
for the very same product.
1First-degree price discrimination implies that each consumer pays a
different price – exactly equal to his/her willingness to pay – for the
exact same product or service.
2“On theWeb, Price Tags Blur –What You Pay Could Depend onWho
You Are”, Washington Post, Sept. 27, 2000.
140 T. Rayna et al.
Indeed, while price-discrimination is profitable for busi-
nesses, it necessarily results in many consumers pay-
ing more than what they otherwise would have. Unlike
other forms of price-discrimination, which are either based
on self-selection (second-degree) or consumer identifica-
tion based on a clear and observable group attribute3
(third-degree), first-degree price discrimination requires
consumers to disclose information that would, otherwise,
remain hidden. Hence, consumers with a high willingness to
pay will most likely do anything they can to avoid revealing
information that would lead them to be price discrimi-
nated. In contrast, consumers with a low willingness to pay4
would find it more interesting to be price-discriminated,
as it would enable them to pay less or even simply to
be able to buy something they could have not otherwise
afforded.
Such a behavior is consistent with the literature related
to privacy and information disclosure. Although generally
reluctant to give up their privacy (because of concerns that
the information could be used against them or create extra
costs), consumers are usually ready to decrease their level
of privacy as long as they are provided with sufficient
incentives (Acquisti and Varian 2005; Hann et al. 2008).
One of such incentives may simply be to clearly inform
consumers on how the data collected are used. Hui et al.
(2007) show that the use of privacy statements by online
services leads to a greater information disclosure. Finan-
cial gains (Hann et al. 2007a, b; Hui et al. 2007), espe-
cially when significant (Hann et al. 2002) can also entice
consumers to give away personal data. Besides financial
motives, other incentives, such as convenience (Hann et al.
2007a, b) and personal benefits (Krasnova et al. 2010),
explain why people agree to disclose personal information.
Hui et al. (2006) actually identify four extrinsic (“monetary
saving, time saving, self-enhancement, social adjustment”)
and three intrinsic (“pleasure, novelty, altruism”) benefits
that induce consumers to decrease their privacy level.
Hence, it is possible to make consumers disclose personal
information, provided that they feel properly rewarded for
this disclosure. To this respect, Acquisti and Varian (2005)
show that rewards, in the form of enhanced personalized
services, can induce consumers to disclose personal infor-
mation. Also, as discussed in Xu et al. (2003) and Chellappa
and Sin (2005), trust plays an important role in consumer
giving away personal data. Indeed, the more consumers trust
that the data they reveal are not going to be used against
3E.g. gender, location, occupation.
4The willingness to pay for a particular product relates to both tastes
and means: one might be really fond of caviar, but being on a low
income, have a low willingness to pay for it. Likewise, someone on
high income who does not really like caviar, may nonetheless have a
high willingness to pay, simply because he/she can afford it.
them, the more readily they give personal information
away.
The aim of this article is to show that, by rewarding
consumers for the disclosure of information, it is possi-
ble to design a form of first-degree price discrimination
that is mutually advantageous to both firms and consumers.
While such a pricing model could be used for many prod-
ucts, this article focuses on the case of digital music and
shows how using mutually advantageous price discrimina-
tion could be used to mitigate the effects of consumer piracy
and, potentially, to increase revenues in the music industry.
This is particularly important at a time when ‘tradi-
tional’ solutions used to curb consumer piracy appear to
have had a very limited effect. Digital Rights Management
systems, which were at some point deemed as a ‘silver
bullet’ against piracy, have remained highly ineffective, as
discussed in Rayna and Striukova (2008a, b), Sinha et al.
(2010) and Vernik et al. (2011), and are nowadays seldom
used for digital music. Likewise, ‘three-strike’ laws, which
have been adopted in some countries (e.g. France, New
Zealand, United Kingdom), have also proven generally inef-
fective because they do not tackle the question of incentives
(Rayna and Barbier 2010).
At the same time, new revenue models, such as ‘free
with advertisement’ (e.g. Spotify, Deezer) or ‘pay what
you want’ (Bandcamp) have emerged and, in some cases,
become quite popular. While such models may be, at times,
successful (Kim et al. 2009; Gneezy et al. 2010), they
often result, overall, in lower revenues for creators and tend
to loosen the relationship between social value and actual
rewards.
The model presented in this article investigates the con-
ditions under which mutually advantageous first-degree
price discrimination is achievable. Besides discussing the
optimal amount of the reward, this article also con-
siders potential pitfalls, as consumers could, indeed,
attempt to manipulate personal data collected in order
to artificially decrease the perceived willingness to pay
(thereby making a financial gain). The robustness of the
model with regard to such opportunistic behavior is also
investigated.
The first section of this article reviews the literature
related to price discrimination (first degree one, in partic-
ular). The second section introduces the concept of mutu-
ally advantageous first-degree price discrimination. The
third section presents how such a pricing model would
be used in the case of digital music. The fourth section
introduces an analytical model that assesses the feasibil-
ity of mutually advantageous price discrimination. The fifth
section develops the model further by taking opportunis-
tic behavior into account. The final section discusses the
limitations of the analytical model as well as practical
considerations.
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The economics of digital price discrimination
Until recently, it has been a widely shared belief that
first-degree price discrimination was little more than a
theoretical curiosity. It is thus not surprising that, in
contrast to second and third-degree price discrimination,
which have been abundantly discussed (Schmalensee 1981;
Bester and Petrakis 1996; Hamilton and Slutsky 2004;
Liu and Serfes 2005; Galera and Zaratiegui 2006; Malueg
and Snyder 2006), the literature devoted to first-degree
price discrimination is comparatively scarce.
Nonetheless, the advent of the internet (and of the digital
economy, in general) has brought first-degree price discrim-
ination back into focus. The first reason for that is that
digital technologies make it possible, for the first time, to
accurately (if not fully) observe the behavior of consumers,
thereby enabling to estimate (or even fully reveal) their val-
uation of digital goods or services (Ulph and Vulkan 2000;
Taylor 2004; Acquisti and Varian 2005). Besides the early
‘proof of concept’ delivered by Amazon in 2000, which
was based on information collected through internet cook-
ies (Villas-Boas 2004), technologies such as Digital Rights
Management systems (embedded in music, video files or
games) provide firms with abundant information about con-
sumers’ consumption patterns (Rayna and Striukova 2008a,
b). More recently, the advent of big data, which enables to
obtain an even more accurate picture by combining the data
collected from a particular consumer with a large quantity
of data of similar customers (e.g. Apple’s “Genius” func-
tionality in iTunes), has brought companies even closer to a
perfect valuation of willingness to pay. Hence, first-degree
price discrimination is, more than ever, closer to becoming
a reality.
This has led to a renewed interest of academics, who
have started to investigate the consequences of first-degree
price discrimination in imperfectly competitive environ-
ments. Hazledine (2006), for example, extends the standard
Cournot-Nash oligopoly model with first-degree price dis-
crimination. Encaoua and Hollander (2007) analyze qual-
ity decisions in a vertically differentiated duopoly where
first-degree price discrimination is made possible. Further
research has also permitted to widen the scope of first-
degree price discrimination by relaxing some assumptions.
Gans and King (2007), for example, demonstrate that the
usual assumption that monopolists need to prevent resale
in order to first-degree price discriminate is, in fact, not
required, even in the case when costless arbitrage mar-
kets exist. Finally, Villas-Boas (1999) has investigated the
role of purchase history on individualized pricing in a
duopoly.
Meanwhile, an important stream of literature has been
discussing price discrimination from the standpoint of ver-
sioning (Shapiro and Varian 1999; Ulph and Vulkan 2000;
Acquisti and Varian 2005; Bandulet and Morasch 2005)
or customizing (Bandulet and Morasch 2005). However,
although versioning and customization may lead to a mar-
ket outcome similar to first-degree price discrimination, it
is not, per se, first-degree price discrimination. Indeed, they
necessarily imply different products (versions) sold, which
leads, at best, to an extreme case of market segmentation,
where each consumer has become a market segment. This
makes versioning closer to second-degree price discrimina-
tion (where consumers self-select the ‘formula’ best-suited
for them). The present article, in contrast, focuses on the
ability firms may have to charge different prices for the
exact same good or service within the same time frame.
Besides the fact that recent technological progress has
made first-degree price discrimination feasible, the other
reason to bring this form of price discrimination into focus
seems, so far, to have been overlooked. Indeed, the emer-
gence of the digital economy has not only made first-degree
price discrimination achievable, but also made socially
desirable. The main economic issue associated with digi-
tal goods is that they behave as public goods5 and result
in market failure. In the case of public goods, economic
efficiency requires such goods to be priced at a rate equal
to the willingness to pay of each consumer (Lindahl 1958;
Foley 1970). Because this is exactly what happens with
first-degree price discrimination, this form of pricing would
enable an efficient market outcome.
Furthermore, first-degree price discrimination has impli-
cations in terms of welfare distribution that make it particu-
larly relevant for digital goods. Indeed, such goods are char-
acterized by a high (usually sunk) initial fixed production
cost and a low (often negligible) reproduction cost. Conse-
quently, in a perfectly competitive environment, the market
price for such goods would be close to zero, hereby pre-
venting producers to recover their initial investment (Arrow
1962).
The traditional solution to this problem has been to
create ‘intellectual monopolies’ (through Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights) to artificially raise the market price. However,
price increase leads to a decrease in social welfare (since
consumers willing to pay at least the marginal cost of
production may be prevented from consuming the good
because of the higher monopoly price), so there is a trade-
off between under-provision and under-utilization (Arrow
1962). In contrast, first-degree price discrimination enables
both an optimal output (and the same total surplus as per-
fect competition) and sufficient incentives for producers, as
the higher revenues enable to recover the initial production
costs.
5Their negligible cost of replication makes digital goods both quasi
non-rival and non-excludable and, hence, public goods (Rayna 2008).
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Hence, first-degree price discrimination has properties
that make it particularly suitable in the case of digital
goods. However, this can only happen if consumers are
willing to accept it, which, considering the uproar that
followed Amazon’s attempt to first-degree price discrimi-
nate, is unlikely to happen. Anticipating the financial loss
resulting from first-degree price discrimination, consumers
with a higher willingness to pay are unlikely to reveal
personal data, or might even attempt to manipulate the infor-
mation they reveal, thereby preventing first-degree price
discrimination. For instance, Taylor (2004) shows that con-
sumers with a high willingness to pay might even engage
in strategic demand reduction when confronted with high
prices, if they anticipate that personal information is used to
price-discriminate them.
It is, thus, not surprising that versioning has become
the most popular form of price discrimination online, since
the personalization of products/services it entails provides
consumers with reasons to accept revealing information
(Acquisti and Varian 2005). Unfortunately, as noted in
Shapiro and Varian (1999), versioning often requires the
creation of “value-subtracted” versions, which is socially
inefficient.
Enabling first-degree price discrimination hence requires
finding a model where both consumers and producers find
it acceptable to adopt this form of pricing. The following
section discusses how this can be achieved by rewarding
consumers for their disclosure of personal data.
The mutually advantageous first-degree price
discrimination principle
Although consumers do value privacy, they are ready to
reveal personal information, as long as they are adequately
rewarded for this disclosure (Acquisti and Varian 2005;
Hann et al. 2002, 2007a, b). It can be thus expected that,
if properly rewarded, consumers would be willing to give
up enough privacy to enable firms to use first-degree price
discrimination. The question is, however, whether mutually
advantageous disclosure is feasible, i.e., whether consumers
can be sufficiently rewarded to incite them to disclose
enough information, while keeping profits of firms suffi-
ciently high, despite the reward.
Using the economic concept of surplus enables to
demonstrate that it is, indeed, possible. Figure 1 represents
the demand function of a consumer for undifferentiated
digital products.6 It is assumed that, as for most digital
6Without changing the results of the model, it can also be seen as the
combined demand function of all consumers for a particular digital
product.
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Fig. 1 Demand and surpluses
products, the marginal cost of production is low and con-
stant. Because firms producing digital goods necessarily
have some degree of monopoly power (as otherwise the
competitive price would be too low to recover the initial
investment), the case of a single monopoly is considered.
With uniform pricing, the market price would be pm.
The producer surplus, which is also the profit, is the area
BCE D . The consumer surplus, which measures their wel-
fare, is the area A BC .
If the firm was able to collect enough personal data to
engage in first-degree price discrimination, it would cap-
ture the whole surplus and the producer surplus/profit would
become A DF , while the consumer surplus would be equal
to zero. Yet, it can be assumed that consumers would,
nonetheless, be willing to accept price discrimination as
long as they obtain at least the same surplus as without price
discrimination.
This means that, provided that the firm is willing to
pay an amount equal to A BC , in exchange for per-
sonal data disclosure, consumers would accept to be price
discriminated and pay a price equal to their reservation
price/willingness to pay. In such a case, the resulting
profit/surplus for the firm would be BCFD , which is
greater than the profit with uniform pricingBCE D , and the
net gain for the firm would be CFE . Because consumers
would be as well off as before and the firm strictly better
off, this form of rewarded first-degree price discrimination
would be clearly mutually advantageous.7
7For the sake of argument, it can be assumed that the firm pays a small
amount over A BC in order to make consumers strictly better off.
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In a perfectly competitive environment, market price
would be equal to marginal cost. The consumer surplus
would be the area A DF and the producer surplus would
be equal to zero. Hence when offering a reward of A BC ,
the firm gains an extra profit equal to the deadweight
loss that necessarily arises in a monopolistic situation with
uniform pricing. Thus, from a social point of view, this
would lead to a Pareto improvement over the monopolis-
tic/oligopolistic situation.8 Furthermore, in comparison to
perfect competition (for which there is no deadweight loss
either), mutually advantageous first-degree price discrim-
ination enables firms to obtain a positive profit, thereby
permitting initial investment sunk costs to be recovered.
Consequently, first-degree price discrimination with mutu-
ally advantageous disclosure is statically equivalent and
dynamically superior to perfect competition.
Mutually advantageous first-degree price
discrimination in practice: the case of digital music
In practice, mutually advantageous first-degree price discri-
mination simply requires that consumers, once price dis-
criminated, never pay more than what they would have
paid with uniform pricing. Taking the example of digital
music, where a track typically costs $0.99, this means that
the minimum reward consumers would accept to disclose
enough personal information to enable firms to price dis-
criminate is such that they never pay more than $0.99 for
a track. Hence for any willingness to pay calculated above
this price, firms will have to provide a “refund” equal to the
difference between the willingness to pay and the uniform
price.
While such a pricing model does not, in fact, change
anything for all the tracks that consumers value at $0.99
or more, it changes everything for tracks for which reser-
vation prices are less than $0.99, as it is for these tracks
that the mutually advantageous trades take place. Although
a rational consumer would never buy something at a
price above his/her reservation price, in the case of dig-
ital goods, consumers have other alternatives as they can
(and often do) download copies of these goods illegally.
Indeed, the key issue is that the fact that consumers do
not value something for as much as the market price does
not mean that they do not value it at all. Likewise, the
cost of ‘serving’ one extra customer in the digital world
is negligible and any amount, even very small, collected
as a result of a sale would increase the profit of the
seller.
8The principle is similar to Calzolari and Pavan (2006), who show that
decrease in privacy can lead to Pareto improvement when none of the
concerned parties are harmed by the disclosure.
Mutually advantageous first-degree price discrimination
hence unlocks a wide range of low value trades that are
nonetheless profitable for both sides. Interestingly, the addi-
tional mutually advantageous trades that are enabled by this
model relate to the right-hand side of the demand function,
which corresponds to the less valued – or less ‘demanded’ –
goods. Hence, it can be seen as a way to monetize the ‘long
tail’.
Although this pricing model does not intrinsically pre-
vent piracy, it reduces the attractiveness of illegal down-
loads, as it enables consumers to purchase tracks (or
albums) of lesser value for what they are actually worth to
them.9 Considering the costs (search costs, learning costs)
and risks (viruses, prosecution, fines) of piracy, it is rather
unlikely that many consumers will find it worth engaging in
it just to save a few cents.
Figure 2 provides a description of how such a system
would function in practice. For a particular track (or album)
consumers would be offered a choice between “buy” (pay-
ing a flat fee, which is the current practice) and “try”. In
the latter case, it means that they let the company access
all the personal data required to calculate their willingness
to pay, in exchange for the guarantee that they will never
actually pay more than the flat price. If they accept, a mon-
itoring system is installed on all devices used to consume
the track, after which the track itself is downloaded. A
trial period, during which personal data are collected and
analyzed, ensues. The trial period ends when enough data
have been collected about consumption of the track itself,
as well as other parameters (consumption of other tracks,
music in general, etc.), to calculate accurately the willing-
ness to pay for the track. Interestingly, this means that the
trial period may be of a different length depending on the
consumer, the artist, the genre of the track, etc. As noted
in Rayna (2008) such a type of customized trial period
is essential to reduce piracy incentives related to ‘sam-
pling’ (and linked to the fact that music is an experience
good).
Once the willingness to pay has been calculated, there
are two possible cases. If the willingness to pay is esti-
mated to be lower than $0.99, the consumer is offered to
buy the song for a price equal to the calculated willing-
ness to pay. If the calculated willingness to pay is above
$0.99, the consumer is ‘refunded’ of the difference between
the willingness to pay and $0.99 (in order to be left as
well off as before) and is offered to pay a price of $0.99.
In both cases, if the consumer agrees, payment takes place
and the track is permanently added to the consumer’s
9In that sense, this model takes the opposite approach to traditional
Digital Rights Management, which tries to prevent piracy without
changing incentives.
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Fig. 2 Sequence of first-degree mutually advantageous price discrim-
ination for digital music
library. The consumer has, in both cases, the possibil-
ity to reject the offer and can decide against buying the
track.
A model of mutually advantageous first degree price
discrimination
The aim of this section is to present an analytical model
that demonstrates the validity of the mutually advantageous
price discrimination model.
A monopolist is assumed to be supplying the whole mar-
ket. It is further assumed that the marginal cost of the
product is constant and equal to zero.10 In addition:
Assumption 1 (Quasi-linearity) Utility functions of the
consumers are quasilinear.
Since quasi-linearity implies that no income effects exist,
this ensures that the consumer surplus is an accurate mea-
sure of consumer welfare.
Assumption 2 (Full Observability) A monitoring system
enabling to fully observe reservation prices/marginal valua-
tions of consumers is available at a constant fixed cost.
Since monitoring requires a one-off fixed cost (presum-
ably sunk), it is left aside in the following analysis.11
The market demand function is:
D(p) = b − ap (1)
When charging a uniform price, the profit maximizing
price, pU ∗, and quantity, qU ∗, for the monopolist are:
pU
∗ = b
2a
(2)
qU
∗ = b
2
(3)
In this case, the consumer (CSU ) and producer surpluses
(PSU ) are:
CSU =
∫ p¯
pU
∗
D(x)dx = b
2
8a
(4)
PSU =
∫ pU ∗
0
qU
∗dx = b
2
4a
(5)
Where p¯ is such that D(p¯) = 0. As expected in such a
monopolistic environment, the total surplus, T SU , is infe-
rior to the total surplus that would have been obtained in
perfect competition, T SC :
T SU = CSU + PSU = 3b
2
8a
(6)
T SC =
∫ p¯
0
D(x)dx = b
2
2a
(7)
A deadweight loss exists due to the price distortion intro-
duced by the monopolist:
DWLU =
∫ pU ∗
0
D(x) − qU ∗dx = b
2
8a
(8)
10Identical result can be obtained with a positive and constant marginal
cost by substitution of variables. Results obtained with increasing
marginal cost are not qualitatively different from the ones obtained in
this model.
11This assumption is further discussed in section “Limitations and
practical considerations”.
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The producer is assumed to be unable to observe the
behavior of consumers (besides what is purchased and at
which price) without their consent. However, the producer
can, with the agreement of the consumers, use monitoring
systems enabling to fully observe the reservation prices and
demand function of each consumer. The producer can sub-
sequently engage in first-degree price discrimination and
charge each consumer, for each unit of good, a price equal
to his/her reservation price (or marginal valuation).
First-degree price discrimination leads to the producer
capturing the whole surplus. If one considers the case of a
representative consumer (i.e. a homogenous population of
consumers with identical preferences), the switch to first-
degree price discrimination clearly causes a loss of welfare
for the consumers. In the case of a continuum of consumers
with different reservation prices, consumers with high val-
uation for the good (i.e. consumers who would purchase
the good at the monopoly price) are made worse-off by
first-degree price discrimination, while consumers with low
valuation can be made better off due to the fact that they are
now able to consume the good.12 In this case, the situation
for the producer is only profitable if both high valuation and
low valuation consumers accept to be monitored.
The producer could convince consumers to reveal their
valuation by giving them a reward R for their disclosure.
In this case, the participation constraints of consumers and
producers in first-degree price discrimination with rewarded
disclosure are:
CSD + R  CSU (9)
PSD − R  PSU (10)
If these two conditions are met, consumers accept to
reveal their valuation (or accept to be monitored, thereby
revealing their valuation) and the producer engages in first-
degree price discrimination. When consumers fully disclose
their reservation prices, the producer does not have any
incentive to depart from perfect first-degree price discrimi-
nation. Thus, the consumer surplus is null and the producer
captures the full surplus:
CSD = 0 (11)
PSD =
∫ p¯
0
D(x)dx = b
2
2a
(12)
It can be noted that the total surplus with first-degree
price discrimination, T SD is higher than the monopolistic
total surplus and is, due to the absence of deadweight loss,
equal to the total surplus in perfect competition:
T SD = PSD = T SC (13)
12These are standard welfare effects of price discrimination, as
detailed in Varian (1985).
Definition 1 Mutually advantageous first-degree price dis-
crimination is defined as a situation where a switch from
uniform pricing to perfect personalized pricing leads to a
Pareto improvement, i.e. the welfare of each party with per-
fect price discrimination is at least equal to their welfare
with uniform pricing and the welfare of at least one party
is strictly superior to the welfare obtained with uniform
pricing.
Remark Since, by definition, mutually advantageous first-
degree price discrimination requires a Pareto improvement,
mutually advantageous first-degree price discrimination
cannot take place in a perfectly competitive environment.
In a perfectly competitive environment, the total surplus is
maximal and no Pareto improvement can take place.
Proposition 1 (Mutually Advantageous First-Degree Price
Discrimination with Rewarded Disclosure and Full Observ-
ability) When the behavior of consumers can be, with their
consent, fully monitored, a mutually advantageous first-
degree price discrimination, as defined in Definition 1, is
achievable provided that:
1. The original economic environment is imperfectly com-
petitive.
2. The consumers are paid a reward R, for disclosing their
reservation prices, such that:
CSU  R  CSU + DWLU
Proof Proof given in Appendix.
Corollary 1 Mutually advantageous first-degree price dis-
crimination is Pareto optimal.
Proof The total surplus is maximal and the deadweight loss
is null under first-degree price discrimination. Therefore, no
further Pareto improvement can be made.
An obvious form of mutually advantageous first-degree
price discrimination takes place when the reward paid to the
consumers is exactly equal to their original consumer sur-
plus. In fact, if the producer decides on the amount of the
reward, it is very likely that a reward equal to the origi-
nal consumer surplus will be chosen, since it is the smallest
compatible reward and it provides the highest possible profit
to the producer.
Proposition 2 (Profit Maximizing Reward) The profit max-
imizing reward, R∗, is defined as the smallest possible
reward acceptable for the consumers:
R∗ = CSU = b
2
8a
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When reservation prices are fully disclosed and R∗ is
given as a reward, the producer surplus is maximal and
the producer obtains all the gains from switching to first-
degree price discrimination. These gains are equal to the
monopolistic deadweight loss DWLU = b28a .
Proof Omitted
Thus, this model demonstrates that it is possible to find
a reward that is compatible with the participation con-
straints of both firms and consumers. It is to be noted
that although consumers do not actually obtain a net finan-
cial gain (since the reward leaves them just as well off
as before), other benefits are generally sufficient to trig-
ger the release of personal data (Hui et al. 2006; Hann
et al. 2007b; Krasnova et al. 2010). Furthermore, several
studies (Spiekermann et al. 2001; Berendt et al. 2005;
Acquisti and Gross 2006) have demonstrated that con-
sumers tend to disclose more information, in practice,
than what their concerns towards privacy would lead to
think.
The importance of not being earnest
The switch from uniform pricing to first-degree price dis-
crimination is not, a priori, supposed to lead to any change
in the behavior of consumers. However, if it is assumed that
the original market demand curve is the sum of the indi-
vidual demands of heterogeneous consumers and that these
consumers remain anonymous (e.g. they are not identified
according to their valuation) until the switch to personalized
pricing is made, there may be an incentive for consumers to
alter their behavior once the change has occurred.
Indeed, the amount of the reward given to consumers
in exchange for disclosing their valuation is based on their
consumer surplus with uniform pricing. Moreover, once
first-degree price discrimination is introduced, the surplus
of the consumers is, without the reward, equal to zero.
Thus, consumers may have an incentive, once the switch to
personalized pricing has occurred, to masquerade as a con-
sumer with a lower willingness to pay, by manipulating the
personal data they supply.
Figure 3 provides an illustration of what such a behav-
ior would be. The original demand function of a type-1
consumer, before the switch to personalized pricing, is D1.
After the switch to first-degree price discrimination, the
consumer is charged her marginal valuation for each unit of
good situated above the marginal cost (the consumer surplus
is, thus, null) and gets a reward equivalent to her con-
sumer surplus with uniform pricing (represented on Fig. 3
by the crosshatched triangle). Nonetheless, if this consumer
were to masquerade as a type-2 consumer, who has a lower
P
Q
MC
Fig. 3 Consumer masquerading and its effect on reward and surplus
valuation and has a demand function D2, the consumer
would pay for each unit of the good the marginal valuation
of a type-2 consumer instead of the marginal valuation of a
type-1 consumer. The consumer would then benefit from a
consumer surplus equal to the surface between D1 and D2.
This would, of course, come at a cost, since this masquerad-
ing consumer would receive the lower reward of a type-2
consumer (represented on Fig. 3 by the plain grey triangle).
The more the consumer masquerades and the higher
her surplus becomes, at the expense of the reward, which
becomes smaller. If the consumer masquerades for a type-
3 consumer, her reward in null, since type-3 consumers are
not consuming the good when there is uniform pricing (D3
is located below pM ). Ultimately, consumers could pretend
that they are type-4, whose valuation for the good is constant
and equal to the marginal cost. In this case, the price they
would be asked to pay for each unit of the good would be
equal to the marginal cost and they would capture the whole
surplus (note that if all consumers adopted this behavior, the
situation would be equivalent to the perfectly competitive
case).
For consumers to be able to masquerade, one needs to
assume that the producer does not have a full monitoring
capability. Although the producer may have a perfect mon-
itoring ability (in the sense that it accurately observes the
behavior of consumers and, from this observation, correctly
calculates the reservation prices), it may not be possible
to monitor all the aspects of the life of consumers. For
instance, a monopoly supplying music could be able to per-
fectly monitor the consumption of music taking place by
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means of computers and other high-tech devices, but remain
unable to monitor consumption through other, less techno-
logically advanced, means, such as audiotapes, CDs, radio,
etc. Consumers would then be able to alter the percep-
tion the producer has of their consumption (and thus of
the marginal value) by substituting consumption with mon-
itored devices for consumption with unmonitored devices.
Assumption 3 (Personal data manipulation) It is assumed
that consumers have the possibility to manipulate the per-
sonal data communicated to the firms, hereby altering the
perception the producer has of their demand function. The
perceived demand function for consumer i then becomes:
D′i = bi − (ai + li )p (14)
Where l ∈ R+ is the amount of deception (‘lie’) chosen by
the consumer.
Remark When l = 0, the consumer remains truthful and
D ≡ D ′. When l → ∞, the observed demand function
becomes flat.
Assumption 4 (Sequentiality) It is assumed that actions
of the firm and of consumers are sequential, i.e., the firm
decides first whether to engage or not in personalized pric-
ing, and then consumers have the opportunity to remain
truthful or to manipulate personal data (Fig. 4).
Producer
Consumer Consumer
Personalised pricing Uniform pricing
Producer
Chooses amount of lie
Consumer
Calculates willingness to pay
Pays price equal to willingness
 to pay minus reward
Does not buyBuys
Fig. 4 Sequentiality of decisions of producer and consumers
Assumption 5 (Representative consumer) In the following
sections, focus is put on a representative consumer whose
behavior will be analyzed:
D′ = b − (a + l)p (15)
Figure 5 shows the inverse demand curves that corre-
spond to both original and masqueraded demand functions.
The first thing that one can notice is that the consumer
always obtains a surplus at least equal to the uniform pric-
ing consumer surplus. This is because the decrease in the
amount of the reward that occurs when the consumer lies is
offset by the gain in consumer surplus. When the consumer
lies so much that no reward is given, the consumer surplus
obtained is strictly superior to the uniform pricing consumer
surplus. Ultimately, when the consumer lies infinitely, she
is able to capture the whole surplus.
However, the producer is unlikely to accept this and
would most certainly prefer the outcome obtained with uni-
form pricing. Since, the more the consumer lies, the lower
the profit of the producer is, there is an amount of lie that
is such that when it is exceeded, the producer does not find
it worthwhile engaging in first-degree price discrimination
and no Pareto improvement can take place. To this respect,
Conitzer et al. (2012) find a similar result in their model
when consumers can ‘anonymize’ for free, which may also
prevent Pareto improvements.
Proposition 3 (Mutually Advantageous First-Degree Price
Discrimination with Rewarded Disclosure and Partial
Observability) When the behavior of consumers can be,
P
Fig. 5 Actual and masqueraded inverse demand functions of a repre-
sentative consumer
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with their consent, partially monitored, a mutually advan-
tageous first-degree price discrimination, as defined in
Definition 1, is only achievable provided that:
1. The original economic environment is imperfectly
competitive.
2. The consumers are paid a reward R for disclosing their
reservation prices such that:
R = CSU
3. The level of lie chosen by the consumers is such that:
l  a
Proof Proof given in Appendix.
Remark If the reward is higher than the minimal acceptable
reward for the consumers, i.e. CSU < R  CSU +DWLU ,
the maximal level of lie acceptable for the producer is
smaller than what is stated in the condition 3 above. If
R = CSU + DWLU , the acceptable level of lie is l = 0.
Lying is not costly
Thus, when consumers can only be partially monitored, the
achievability of mutually advantageous first-degree price
discrimination depends solely on the truthfulness of con-
sumers. When lying does not entail any cost, consumer
obviously choose the maximum amount of lie and thus
captures the whole surplus, leaving the producer with a
profit equal to zero. Therefore, when consumers can only be
partially monitored and lying is costless, mutually advanta-
geous first-degree price discrimination is unachievable.
Proposition 4 (Mutually Advantageous First-Degree Price
Discrimination with Partial Observability and no Lying
Cost) When the behavior of consumers can only be par-
tially monitored and when consumer can alter their behav-
ior at no cost to masquerade as low valuation consumers,
mutually advantageous first-degree price discrimination is
never achievable.
Proof Proof given in Appendix.
It is important to note that this situation is, in fact, a moral
hazard problem. In the original situation with uniform pric-
ing, consumers do not have incentive to lie. However, as
soon as the switch to personalized pricing is made (which
corresponds, in fact, to the establishment of a new con-
tract), they have strong incentives to do so. Personalized
pricing would lead to a net welfare improvement over the
uniform pricing situation. If the actions of consumers were
fully observable, the incentives to lie would disappear and
a Pareto outcome could be achieved. This is, therefore,
a problem of hidden actions, which makes the outcome
sub-optimal.
Linear cost of lying
It is quite likely, though, that lying comes at a cost. Con-
sumers could fool the producer by consuming music on
unmonitored devices, such as low-tech audiotapes or CDs,
instead of monitored high-tech devices, such as computers,
smartphones, tablets or iPod-type media players. How-
ever, this would certainly come at the expense of efforts
and inconvenience (consumers may have to carry several
devices with them). It may also carry additional costs if
the consumer has to purchase additional devices. In any
case, it is reasonable to assume that lying is increasingly
costly, since lying more requires to modify one’s consump-
tion behavior to a larger extent. For instance, consumers
willing to masquerade as low valuation consumers would
have to consume proportionally more goods they value less
on a monitored device, while, at the same time, consuming
proportionally more goods they value more through alterna-
tive means.
Let us first assume that the cost of lying increases
linearly:
Assumption 6 (Linear cost of lying)
c(l) = kl, k  0 (16)
One can expect that the chosen amount of lie l will be the
one that equates the marginal gain of lying with the marginal
cost of doing so, k. Also, logically, there is an amount of
the marginal cost k that is such that consumers never find it
worthwhile lying.
Proposition 5 (Mutually Advantageous First-Degree Price
Discrimination with Partial Observability and Linear Lying
Cost) When the behavior of consumers can only be par-
tially monitored and when consumers can alter their behav-
ior to masquerade as low valuation consumers by modi-
fying, by a factor l, the demand function observed by the
producer and that the cost of lying is linear and of the form:
c(l) = kl, k  0
two possible outcomes exist:
• if k  k∗, consumers do not lie (l = 0) and first-degree
price discrimination takes place.
• if k < k∗, consumers choose a level of lie l > a and
first-degree price discrimination does not take place.
With:
k∗ = b
2
8a2
(17)
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Proof Proof given in Appendix.
Figure 6 shows net gain curves for the consumer in the
three different cases mentioned above (k < k∗, k = k∗,
k > k∗).
It is worth noting that the critical marginal cost, k∗,
depends positively on the degree of valuation of the con-
sumers b
a
:
∂k∗
∂ b
a
= b
4a
> 0
Thus, consumers with a higher valuation for the good are
more likely to find it worthwhile lying. Assuming that the
marginal cost of lying is the same for all consumers, in a
population of heterogeneous consumers, consumers with a
high valuation for the good may be inclined to lie while
consumers with a lower valuation might decide to remain
truthful. Likewise, consumers with a higher valuation are
expected to find it worthwhile to lie more ( ∂l
∗
∂b/a
> 0).
Non-linear cost of lying
It is, in fact, quite sensible to assume that the cost of lying
is not linear, but instead that the marginal cost of lying is
increasing. Although it should not be too difficult to change
the demand curve perceived by the producer by using once
in a while an (unmonitored) audio-CD player instead of a
computer or a media player, doing so intensively is likely
to be grueling, especially at a time when most high-tech
devices (if not all devices) are likely to be monitored.
Assumption 7 (Non-linear cost of lying) It is now assumed
that the cost of lying is:
c(l) = lk, k  1 (18)
Proposition 6 (Mutually Advantageous First-Degree Price
Discrimination with Partial Observability and Non-Linear
Lying Cost) When the behavior of consumers can only
be partially monitored and when consumer can alter their
behavior to masquerade as low valuation consumers by
modifying, by a factor l, the demand function observed by
the producer and that the cost of lying is non-linear and of
the form:
c(l) = lk, k  1
Mutually advantageous first-degree price discrimination
only exists if:
ak+1
b2
 1
8k
In this case, the optimal amount of lie for the consumer is
(Fig 7):
l∗ =
(
b2
8a2k
) 1
k−1
Proof Proof given in Appendix.
In terms of welfare, it is important to note that, due to the
cost of lying, the total welfare is inferior to first-degree price
discrimination but superior to the uniform pricing case:
T SU  T SD(l∗)  T SD
And:
T SD(l
∗) → T SD ⇔ l∗ → 0
T SD(l
∗) → T SU ⇔ l∗ → a
More lies means a higher surplus for the consumers but this
comes at the expense of a lower total surplus. In contrast,
fewer lies leads to a higher total surplus but also to a lower
consumer surplus.
Limitations and practical considerations
The model presented in this article adopts the assumptions
and methodology of mainstream economics models and,
as such, suffers the same limitations. In particular, it is
assumed that both consumers and firms are substantively
rational and have a perfect access to information about their
environment, but also about themselves. Of course, this
form of modeling and its implied assumptions, although
still widely used, has been criticized in the literature on
numerous occasions for being too unrealistic. In particu-
lar, the works of Simon (1959) and Kahneman and Tversky
(1979) have emphasized the weaknesses of the concept of
rationality in standard economic models.
Fig. 6 Net gain of the
consumer as a function of the
level of lie (linear case)
k = k*
a l
Net gain
k > k*
l
Net gain
a
k < k*
a l
Net gain
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Fig. 7 Net gain of the
consumer as a function of the
level of lie (non-linear case)
a
a
l
l
Net gain Net gain
In the case of this article, however, adopting more real-
istic behavioral assumptions tends to reinforce further the
worthiness of the pricing model proposed. Indeed, if one
considers, as in Simon (1959), that individuals have a
bounded rationality, which entails a limited knowledge of
their environment but also of themselves, and limited pro-
cessing capabilities, the pricing mechanism presented in this
article could have a further value, as it can act as a Decision
Support System.
Aggregating and analyzing a vast amount of data from
many consumers would probably lead the system to know
each consumer better than they know themselves. It could
know, for instance, that for a particular consumer, a partic-
ular ‘summer hit’ is not just a fad, but will be consumed
all her life or, in contrast, that a consumer keeps purchasing
albums from one particular artist that she, in fact, never or
rarely listens to. Furthermore, in light of the massive amount
of digital content available to consumers (there are over 30
million songs on the iTunes Store), such a system would
be able to accurately recommend new artists or even new
genres, which would make it a very valuable service for con-
sumers. This kind of added value services correspond well,
in fact, to the “enhanced personalized services” discussed
in Acquisti and Varian (2005) and would, therefore, provide
intrinsic motivations to disclose information.
Furthermore, the ‘refund’ mechanism introduced in the
model would enable to artificially create value for con-
sumers. Indeed, consumers generally tend to perceive gains
and loses in an asymmetric manner (Kahneman and Tversky
1979), which means that a more expensive offer (e.g. $120)
with a partial refund (e.g. $20) is generally perceived as hav-
ing a higher value than an identical offer at the same total
price (e.g. $100). Hence, consumers would perceive more
value if they are charged $3 for a track (their willingness to
pay) and ‘refunded’ $2.01, than if the same track was sold
to them for $0.99.
Tversky and Kahneman (1981) also demonstrate the exis-
tence of a “framing effect”, which radically influences peo-
ple’s decision depending on the perception of the context.13
13In Tversky and Kahneman (1981), this is evidenced by changing the
wording of the questions, without altering their actual meaning.
The question of framing, in relation to privacy and informa-
tion disclosure, was discussed in Hui et al. (2007) and shows
that, indeed, beyond the monetary rewards offered, the man-
ner in which the pricing system is presented to consumers
will be of critical importance.
Finally, with regard to rationality, economists generally
assume that individuals are only motivated by profit and not
by fairness. Yet, one of the reasons why Amazon price dis-
crimination strategy backfired is because consumers iden-
tified as having a high willingness to pay found it unfair
to have paid more than other consumers for the exact same
product. Obviously, one could expect the same issue to arise
with the pricing scheme presented in this article. However,
it is important to note that, unlike in the Amazon case (or
first-degree price discrimination in general), this model has
a ‘maximum amount of unfairness’: $0.99.
Indeed, regardless of how high their willingness to pay is,
‘high spending’ consumers never pay more than $0.99 per
track (conversely, consumers with the lowest willingness to
pay never pay less than $0). Furthermore, when compar-
ing two consumers, because they have different tastes, it is
very unlikely that one will systematically pay more than the
other. There will also be many cases when they actually pay
the same price ($0.99).
There are countless examples that show that consumers
are not always against paying more than others, as long
as other consumers can know that they have done so, as
spending more may give a greater sense of self-worthiness.
Although this is particularly visible with ‘brands’ and fash-
ion, this could also be the case with this form of pricing.
Indeed, it would not be too far-fetched to imagine con-
sumers sharing online their willingness to pay for a par-
ticular track or album and competing with one another to
become the ‘biggest fan’ of a particular act.
Another aspect of the model that could be considered
as unrealistic is the fact that monitoring costs have been
left aside. The reason for that is that monitoring costs are
expected to be mainly fixed costs. Indeed, the most signifi-
cant cost would be the development cost of the monitoring
software and of the data mining processes. Once these are
properly set-up, what remains are (negligible) maintenance
costs. Another type of costs relates to the cost of storage
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and processing user data. These were considered as fixed
or negligible in the model for two reasons. Firstly, because
if data storage and processing are carried out by the firm,
although the quantity of monitoring data and the computing
power needed to process them would increase over time, the
trend over the past 40 years has been constantly decreasing
storage and computing costs (to the point that many cloud
services, even from smaller firms, are nowadays offered
free of charge). Secondly, firms could decide to adopt a
distributed computing approach and keep the data stored
on users’ devices (with some level of redundancy). Like-
wise, consumers’ computers and devices could supply the
computing resources needed to process the data.
Of course, in either case, the initial investment may still
be too large for certain firms, especially smaller ones, to
engage in mutually advantageous first-degree price discrim-
ination. However, smaller firms would probably not have
enough data to accurately estimate willingness to pay. The
strength of Apple’s iTunes Genius or Google’s Instant Mix
(and their accuracy in predicting what people want to listen
to) precisely lies in the vast amount of user data they are
able to gather.14 Hence, the pricing mechanism described in
this article would be more likely to be carried out by firms
of a significantly large size.
There are also practical issues that need to be consid-
ered. An important one is the compliance of such a system
with existing laws and regulations. For instance, regulatory
frameworks, such as the EU ‘Directive on privacy and elec-
tronic communications’ (2002/58/EC), restrict the amount
and type of information that can be collected by firms about
consumers. As noted in Goldfarb and Tucker (2011), the
advent of such regulations has had a significantly negative
impact on the effectiveness of online advertising. Similarly,
one of the main obstacles of the pricing model presented in
this article may well be privacy laws. However, it is to be
noted that such laws have been passed because a large part
of the population were concerned that data collected were
used against them. Since the first-degree price discrimina-
tion introduced in this article is actually beneficial to the
consumers, it is not unreasonable to think that laws could be
amended accordingly.
A second practical issue, with legal implications, relates
to the use of data against customers. Indeed, although the
maximum price is capped and consumers have the pos-
sibility to refuse the quoted price, thereby preventing the
company to misuse data to capture more surplus, nothing
prevents the firm from using (or selling) the collected data
for other products and services than music. Indeed, it is quite
14As of June 2013, Apple iTunes Store has 575 million active users
(http://tech.fortune.cnn.com/2013/06/15/apple-algebra-itunes-asymco/).
possible that the data collected as a part of this music pric-
ing scheme could be used to price-discriminate consumers
in other markets. Of course, if that were the case and con-
sumers would become aware of it (or simply if they expect
this to happen), this would make mutually advantageous
price discrimination unachievable.
A final practical issue relates to users without data.
Indeed, while consumers who have been using iTunes (or a
similar software) for a while already have data that can be
used to determine their willingness to pay (iTunes records
which tracks have been played and when, when tracks were
added to the library, etc.), calculating the willingness to
pay for consumers with no data history is a challenge. Of
course, the trial period could be extended until sufficient
data has been collected, but this would practically turn the
service into a (temporary) free-of-charge ‘all-you-can-eat
buffet’ for such users, since they would be able to try any
number of tracks for a significant period of time, before
enough information has been collected about their con-
sumption behavior. Furthermore, the data collected might
not lead to sufficiently accurate estimates of the willing-
ness to pay, since observed consumption would be taking
place in an environment devoid of financial constraints. At
this stage, it is not quite clear whether this issue will actu-
ally be a significant one and it may well be the case that the
information collected on other consumers enables to rapidly
‘profile’ a consumer without data. If this is not the case, an
option could be to require consumers without any data to
use flat pricing until there is enough data for them to join
the scheme.
A final question is which other goods this model could
be applied to. A key aspect of this model is the possibil-
ity consumers have to finally decide not to purchase the
track/album at the price quoted after the observation period.
For this reason, this model may only be applicable to goods
that are consumed repeatedly. Indeed, for movies or books,
which are typically consumed once only, consumers would
have no incentive to accept the quoted price, since they
have already consumed the good during the observation
period and have no willingness to consume it again. Hence,
besides music, this model could be applied to software,
games and, possibly, TV Shows.15 In any case, as noted
in section “Lying is not costly”, mutually advantageous
first-degree price discrimination is only ever possible when
consumption can be significantly monitored, which most
likely precludes the use of this model for any non-digital
good.
15Episodes are generally watched once, but a series consists of many
episodes.
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Conclusion
Digital technologies have created both a large potential for
economic growth and potentially more sources of market
failures. In particular, recent events in ICT (especially in
regard to piracy and privacy) have shown the inadequacy of
current pricing models.
This article has introduced a new way of resolving con-
flicting interests while improving social welfare, through
mutually advantageous first-degree price discrimination
based on personal information. What is particularly impor-
tant, is that this result is obtained under the assumption that
all parties involved behave strategically. Even when firms
and consumers behave selfishly, a ‘greater good’ can be
achieved through first-degree price discrimination, because
of the additional surplus (which is then shared amongst
participants) this form of pricing generates.
However, the feasibility of such a scheme strongly
depends on the ability of firms to actually fully monitor the
actions of consumers. If their actions remain even partially
hidden, a masquerading opportunistic behavior on the con-
sumer side may prevent the establishment of this mutually
advantageous way of price discriminating.
An avenue for further research could be to extend the
current model, for instance, by considering ‘generic’ lying
cost functions or by considering the feasibility of mutu-
ally advantageous price discrimination when consumers are
heterogenous. Also, it would be interesting to assess the fea-
sibility and performance of such pricing model within an
oligopolistic environment.
Furthermore, it would be interesting to consider mech-
anisms enabling to impede opportunistic behavior, such as
rewarding consumers based on the amount of time they are
monitored, and their influence on the feasibility of mutu-
ally advantageous first-degree price discrimination. It could
also be worthwhile considering what happens if consumers
‘dislike’ being monitored.While the consequences are fairly
obvious when this corresponds to a perceived one-off cost
for consumers, this might get far more complex when con-
sumer perceive a cost of giving up privacy that depends on
the amount of data revealed.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1 Proof of 1.: if the original environ-
ment is perfectly competitive, there is no deadweight loss
and R = CSU . Consequently, no Pareto improvement can
be made. Proof of 2.: The participation constraints Eqs. 9
and 10 can be combined:
CSU  R  PSD − PSU (19)
Since:
PSD − PSU =
∫ p¯
0
D(x)dx −
∫ pU ∗
0
qU
∗dx
=
∫ p¯
pU
∗
D(x)dx +
∫ pU ∗
0
D(x) − qU ∗dx
= CSU + DWLU
Equation 19 simplifies as:
CSU  R  CSU + DWLU (20)
Proof of Proposition 3 Two cases need to be considered,
depending on whether a reward is given to the consumer
(l  a) or not (l > a). When l > a, the producer surplus is:
PSD =
∫ p¯′
0
D′(x)dx = b
2
2(a + l)
Thus, for l > a, PSD < PSU and the producer never
engages in first-degree price discrimination.
When l < a,
PSD =
∫ pU
0
D′(x)dx = b
2
8a2
(3a − l)
PSD > PSU and the producer engages in first-degree
price discrimination. When l = a, PSD = PSU and the
producer is indifferent between uniform and personalized
pricing.
Proof of Proposition 4 Since consumers necessarily obtain
a surplus (through reward or actual surplus) at least equal
to the uniform pricing consumer surplus, the net additional
surplus they earn by lying needs to be considered.
When l  a, the additional gain of surplus obtained by
the consumer when lying is:
CSla =
∫ pU ∗
0
(D(x) − D′(x))dx = b
2
8a2
l (21)
When l > a, no reward is given to the consumer and the
gain obtained (in addition to the original consumer surplus)
when lying is:
CSl>a =
∫ pU ∗
0
D(x)dx −
∫ p¯′
0
D′(x)dx = b
2
8a
3l − a
a + l
(22)
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The derivatives of the gain, with respect to the amount of
lie, l, are:
∂
∂l
CSla = b
2
8a2
(23)
∂
∂l
CSl>a = b
2
2(a + l)2 (24)
Since the two derivatives are positive (for a > 0 and b > 0),
the consumer would choose, as long as lying is not costly,
an infinite amount of lie (l → ∞). In this case, the gain of
surplus is equal to the monopolistic deadweight loss:
lim
l→∞ CSl>a =
3b2
8a
= DWLU
Proof of Proposition 5 The consumer chooses the amount
of lie, l, for which the marginal gain is equal to the marginal
cost. When l  a, the net gain, CSla − c(l), changes
linearly with l:
CSla − c(l) = ( b
2
8a2
− k)l
The net gain is null when the marginal cost, k, reaches a
critical value k∗:
k∗ = b
2
8a2
• When k > k∗, CSla − c(l) < 0 and l = 0
• When k = k∗, CSla − c(l) = 0 ∀ l ∈ [0, a] and l ∈
[0, 1], in which case, consumers might as well decide,
in exchange for an extra reward  → 0, to choose l = 0
• When k < k∗, CSla − c(l) > 0 ∀ l ∈ [0, a] and
l = 1
Remark Although it is known, from Proposition 3, that the
producer does not engage in first-degree price discrimina-
tion when l > a, it is still worthwhile studying whether the
consumer would indeed have interest to choose such level
of lie. When l > a, the net gain is:
CSl>a − c(l) = b
2
8a
3l − a
a + l − kl
And:
∂
∂l
CSl>a − c(l) = 0 ⇔ l = b√
2k
− a
Thus, when k < k∗, the level of lie l∗ that maximizes the
additional gain for the consumer is:
l∗ = b√
2k
− a (25)
It can be easily checked that l∗ > a if and only if k < k∗.
Proof of Proposition 6 Two cases have again to be consid-
ered, depending on whether a reward is paid to the consumer
(l  a) or not (l > a). When l  a, the net gain of the
consumer is:
CSla − c(l) = b
2
8a2
l − lk
∂
∂l
(
CSla − c(l)
) = b2
8a2
− klk−1
∂
∂l
(
CSla − c(l)
) = 0 ⇔ l =
(
b2
8a2k
) 1
k−1
The optimal level of lie for the consumer is thus:
l∗ =
(
b2
8a2k
) 1
k−1
(26)
First-degree price discrimination only occurs if l∗  a. This
is the case when:
ak+1
b2
 1
8k
(27)
As in the linear case, it can be noticed that a higher val-
uation for the good leads to a higher incentive to lie and,
hence, a less likely mutually advantageous first-degree price
discrimination.
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